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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- FREEDOM OF RELIGION -TumoN PAYMENTS TO
PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS VIOLATE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Because defendant
school district did not maintain a high school within the school district,
tuition payments were made, as provided by statute,1 to the high schools
attended by pupils residing within the district. The parents of each student selected the high school to be attended. As a result of this program,
some tuition payments were made to high schools operated by the Roman
Catholic Church. Plaintiff taxpayer sought in a declaratory judgment a
determination of the validity of tuition payments made to Catholic high
schools under the United States Constitution2 and the Constitution of Vermont.3 The court of chancery held the payments unconstitutional. On
appeal, held, affirmed. The payment of tuition to a religious denominational school by a public entity constitutes an "establishment of religion"
in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.4 Swart v. South Burlingon Town School Dist., 167 A.2d 514 (Vt. 1961).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the fundamental rights
embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment embrace
the religious guarantees of the first amendment,5 but the Court has not yet
fully defined what constitutes an "establishment of religion.'' 6 While some
of the language used in the Court's opinions would suggest that an absolute
separation must exist between church and state,7 this idea has never been
applied to the facts in any particular case.8 In fact, the Court has permitted
the state to provide books9 and transportation10 to parochial school children on the theory that such payments are not an establishment of religion
but rather the legitimate promotion of the secular education and well-being
of the children. However, the financing of religious institutions and religious teaching does constitute the "establishment of religion."11
1 VT.

STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 793 "(1958).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 VT. CONST. art. 3, ch. 1.
4 The lower court held that the prohibitions under the United States and Vermont
Constitutions were identical. The Vermont Supreme Court reached its decision in the
principal case solely on the basis of the United States Constitution. Since the tuition
payments would be void if there was a violation of either constitution, the Court based
its holding on the United States Constitution which it felt contained more stringent
constitutional limitations. Principal case at 518.
5 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
6 See generally KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY (1956); O'NEILL, REUGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CoNSTITUTION (1949); Corwin, The Supreme Court as a
National School Board, 14 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 3 (1949).
7Everson v. United States, 330 U.S. l (1947); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948).
SEven in the McCollum case (p. 211) the Court refused to adopt completely the idea
of absolute separation, because it cited with approval the decision in the Everson case.
9 Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
10 Everson v. United States, supra note 7.
11Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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The court in the principal case found that the religious affairs of the
Catholic church could not be separated from its educational instruction
and, as a result, concluded that tuition payments were financing the teaching of the Catholic religion. The payment of tuition directly to parochial
schools in the principal case is distinguishable from the fonns of aid held
constitutional by the Supreme Court in two respects. First, tuition payments may be used by the school for any purpose, while the money expended by the state for books and transportation was earmarked for particular purposes which the Court found to be non-religious. Second, the
tuition payments in the principal case were made directly to the school,
while the payment for bus transportation was a reimbursement to the
parent. Thus the payment of tuition by the state differs from forms of state
assistance found to be constitutional both in the type of aid and in the
method of payment.
The President's program of federal grants to parochial colleges and
universities12 is based on the assumption that the constitutionality of any
program depends on the type of aid rendered by the state. The President
has expressed the opinion that grants to sectarian colleges are constitutional
because these grants are expressly limited in scope, while direct grants to
parochial elementary and secondary schools would be unconstitutional if
unlimited in scope.is This argument assumes that grants which are made
for particular purposes will not support the teaching of religion, while
those made without limitation may in part finance religious education.
Regardless of the type of the grant, all state grants to parochial schools or
colleges will aid the teaching of religion. If the expenses were not paid by
the state grant, the parochial school or the parent supporting the parochial
school would pay these expenses out of other funds. This means that any
specific state or federal grant frees funds for the parochial school to use as
it would use the funds from a grant without limitation.
In the principal case the school district implemented the Vermont
statute by making tuition payments directly to the schools where the
students were in attendance. The statute would seem to permit school
districts to exercise a wide discretion in the selection of means to implement
the statutory objective.14 In fact, the court in the principal case suggests
that payment of tuition might have been made to the parents as a discharge
of the state's duty to provide educational facilities.15 If the payment of
tuition to parents were held constitutional, the assumption behind such a
12 This program is one of grants to state, private and parochial oolleges and universities for the construction of dormitories. and academic facilities.
13 N.Y. Times, March 12, 1961, § 4, p. 2, col. 1.
14 VA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 793 (b) (1958): "Each town district shall pay tuition per
pupil per school year as billed, but not in excess of $325 unless authorized by a vote of
the town school district, but in no case shall the tuition exceed the cost per pupil per year
for the maintenance of such school for the previous year."
15 Principal case at 515-16.
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decision would be that the constitutionality of a state grant would depend
on the method in which payment was made. The New York program for
aid to higher education16 is based upon an assumption that payments to
the pupils or their parents are constitutional. The New York program also
contains a "need" requirement which, according to the New York Attorney
General, is necessary for the constitutionality of the plan in order to
demonstrate that the parents and not the parochial schools are the recipients of the state funds.1 7 Since the Supreme Court has recognized the
rights of parents to control the education of their children,18 it might be
argued that there is a basis for distinguishing between grants to parents
and grants to parochial schools. But regardless of how grants are paid, the
ultimate recipient will be the school or college in which the parent enrolls
his child. The substantive effect of a program such as the New York program of the federal scholarship plan is the same as if direct grants were
paid to parochial schools for the tuition of their students.
The current proposals to aid parochial schools have not been satisfactorily distinguished from direct grants of money given in the principal case.
Neither the type of aid given by the state or federal grant nor the method
of its payment create substantive differences in result. Yet aid given for a
particular purpose to the parents of parochial school children has been held
constitutiona1.10 It remains for the United States Supreme Court to establish
more meaningful standards to determine what aid to sectarian schools constitutes an "establishment of religion."
William S. Bach

16 The New York program calls for grants of up to $150 per semester to students paying over $100 in tuition. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 389, § 601-a.
17 N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1961, § I, p. 31, col. 5.
18 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
19 Cochran v. Board of Educ., supra note 9; Everson v. United States, supra note 7.

